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THE INTER-DEPENDENCE OF BOTE'S ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS
AS SHOWN IN HIS PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
PART I
METAPHYSICS
Introduction This thesis is an attempt to do three
things
:
(1) to briefly give the essential elements in
Bowne 1 s Ethics and Metaphysics;
(2) to show for the most par^ his ethics depends
on his metaphysics;
(3) and that both ethics and metaphysics are in-
complete until they are concluded in the phil
sophy of religion.
ONTOLOGY
Definitions The definitions of our important terms
come first. Metaphysics asks the question,
What is reality?
What is meta-
physics? Leighton used the words "metaphysics"
and "philosophy" as synonyms. But since rneta
physics is a branch of philosophy, Leighton is not correct in
calling metaphysics by the more inclusive title, "philosophy".
The nature of these immanent principles will be made apparent
after the other terms are defined.

2What is ethics? Bowne says that "Ethics aims to find
and formulate the principles which under-
lie practice in order that we may better understand and guide
our lives". (2) He recognizes in ethics several distinct
'
several diotinofr factors, a set of aims to be realized; a set
of formal judgments concerning right and wrong; and a set of
commands to be obeyed. (3) These three factors are made central
in the analysis of Christian ethics by MacKenzie, who, like
Bowne, is in agreement with Schleiermacher . (4) Brightman
defines ethics as "the normative science of morals or conduct".
(5) Everett calls it the "science of values in their relation
to the conduct of life as a whole". (S) Ethics, is the attempt
to answer the question, "What ought I to do?"
What is per- The definition of personalism is not
sonalism?
unanimously fixed by the followers of per-
sonalism. Dean Knudson takes seventy pages in "The Philosophy
of Personalism" to tell what personalism means. Bowne called^his
own^ transcendental empiricism". (7) Since the outer world has
only phenomenal reality he says "phenomenalism" would describe
his position. The world of objective experience is a thought
world which has no meaning or reality apart from intelligence;
hence, "objective idealism" is an appropriate designation for
Bowne' s system. (8) Bowne means by "transcendentalism" and
" empir ieism" , that we cannot test "our fundamental experience by
the categories" , but must "find the meaning of the categories in
experience". (9) But this experience, Bowne teaches, "is not

3the passive experience of sense, but the active self-experience of
intelligence". (10) Since Bowne believed that living, acting in-
telligence is the source of all truth and. reality, it is correct
to call his system " personalism"
,
although he did not popularize
the term himself. Kis students and friends have made much more
of the word than he did. Dr. Brightman says that personalism
is "the theory that to be is to be a self or a member of a self".
(11) It is permissible to use the words "self" and "soul" inter-
changeably, for the soul is "the living self". (13)
What is the The soul is "the self that thinks and feels
self?
and wills, and in this activity experiences
and knows itself as the active and abiding subject of this inner
life". (13) With this background, the final definition of
personality is clearer. Personality is "self-consciousness,
self-knowledge, and self-control". (14) This is possible in
the fullest sense only to the infinite. Dr. Brightman has
developed this thought further in defining a person as "a self
capable of attaining sufficient unity to create values". (15)
THE METAPKY- With the ground somewhat cleared by
sics OF BOWHI
Aim and field these definitions, we are free to
of metaphysics
continue. The first distinction that
must be made is that between phenomenal and ontological reality.
The latter is the field, of metaphysics, while the former is the
field of experience. It is the work of science to discover
the necessary connections in the realm of .phenomenal reality,
while it is the work of metaphysics to formulate the theory
of ultimate reality. Thus metaphysics includes science and
f
interprets science, but goes beyond science to the fundamental
categories that make being; intelligible.
The notion We will study Bowne' s ethics* and metaphy-
of being
sics before shov/ing their interrelations.
His metaphysics begins with "the notion of being". It is cer-
tain that there is "being". Bowne rejects the common-sense
notion that "the mark of being is to be found pre-eminently in
sense-phenomena". (16) Neither is he satisfied to define being
as that which can be perceived. The distinctive mark of being
is in some power of action. (17) Things exisf whether they are
perceived or not because, though not perceived, they are in
interaction with one another. Since the phenomenal world mani-
fests incessant change and motion, he adds to the phenomena the
notion of an agent which causes them. He demands that being
contain in itself the ground and the explanation of what exists.
y
Being, then, is viewed as definite, as active, and as caf^al.
A
He distinguishes between phenomenal and ontological reality.
Matter is the phenomenal product of a dynamic within it.
The phenome- In this underlying reality, all is activity,
nality of mat-
ter or phenome- All things are in continuous interaction,
nal and onto-
logical reality The seeming inaction of matter is an illusion
This is a principle of physics as well as of metaphysics.
Pure being is Bowne, like Hegel, holds that on tho point -
an abstraction
that "pure being is an abstraction" . Hegel
rr
begins with pure being. But we may begin our dialectic
anywhere in his system and arrive at the same conclusion.
Hegel says that "being and nothing are the most abstract,
the poorest, and therefore the initial forms of opposi-
tion". (18) "The advance from the abstract to the con-
crete is shown to be The Idea driving itself forth and
developing itself from itself". (19) And again Hegel says,
"My view is that The Idea must be grasped and expressed
only as process in itself; (e.g., as becoming) as movement;
for the true is not a mere resting;, a being, but only as
self-moving, as alive...." (20)
From this presentation, it would appear
that Hegel and Bowne agree on pure being as an abstraction.
Hegel starts with pure being and proceeds to something more
definite. It would seem fair to Hegel to say that while
Bowne wa^^Hegelian , he was influenced by Hegel. Bowne
rejects pure being in these words, "The notion of pure being
is rejected, (l) as being only a logical concept, and, as
such, incapable of real existence; and, (2) as inadequate
to the functions it has to perform. There is no progress
from it to definite being, and there is no regress from
definite being to it". (21) In this respect, Bowne and
Hegel are agreed, even if Hegel's dialectic does not clearly
show how we arrive from "pure being" and "nothing" to
"becoming" and finally"The Idea" itself. Bowne and Hegel
agree also on the necessity of action as allied to being.

5"Being and action are inseparable". (22)
The net result Bowne rejects the crude sense-
metaphysics which sees reality in that
which can be pictures and grasped by the senses. Phe-
nomenal reality must not be taken as final reality.
Ontological reality is not a problem for the senses but
rather a problem for thought. Within the "lumps of
matter" we must see a dynamic energy, which is the real
nature of being. We have not yet shown the differences
between phenomenal and ontological reality. When we
shall have considered the nature of the world-ground,
these differences will become clearer.
TH2 NATURE The second of our metaphysical con-
OF THINGS
Definition of siderations is called "the nature of
" the nature of
things" things" . The nature of a thing is
the real essence of that thing, the inner principle by which
a thing is what it is. (23) This real nature cannot be
found in sense-qualities.
Nature not in The Nature of things cannot be shown
sense-qualities
to us through the senses. The rejection
of a crude sense criterion may lead to agnosticism, if not
to the denial of quality to being. Or, again, it may lead
to an uncritical intuitional view, or a knowledge of the
f
7unseen by a kind of occult power that abandons reason entirely.
If we allow that we cannot determine the qualities of being,
we are in agreement with Herbert and other agnostics. If
we allow being, but deny qualities to being, we are back
to "pure being" again that we thought we had disposed of
some time ago. It must be denied, also, that Bowne in his
earlier views held that intuition could reveal the nature of
Two views a thing. "The outcome of the previous
criticised
argument is, that no intuition or action
of the receptivity can reveal the nature of a thing. This
nature must forever remain supersensible, and its determina-
tion must always be a problem of reason, not of sense". (24)
In a letter to Dr . Cell, Bowne seems to differ with himself
on this point. "Any knowledge of reality must finally
rest on some important intuition of which no further account
may be given." (25) Can these be harmonized? I believe
that Bowne meant in the first instance that we cannot grasp
reality by looking at it. Bowne would not change this view
even in the "epoch of his maturity". There is no essential
contradiction in the two statements insofar as reason and in-
tuition are both supersensible from the standpoint of crude
sense-experience.
Final view of The conclusion of Bowne ' s position on "the
"the nature
of things" nature of things" is that "law or principle"
determines the form and character of a thing's activity. (26)
t
The attempt to think of a thing as a quality has failed, and
Sowne concludes that we must think of thing as a law of ac-
tivity. I believe there is dissatisfaction in the thought
of being as law, but being without law is nothing. (27)
To know the law which makes the differences in things, "is
to know the thing in itself, or in its inmost essence"
.
(28)
We have not yet developed the notion of being sufficiently
"to say whether the physical elements fill out the notion
of being". (29)
CHANGS AND Neither science nor philosophy
IDENTITY
Definition of defines change as "a lawless and
Change
groundless sequence" . (30) A causal
continuity is assumed by science and philosophy "between
the successive states of reality ereby each is founded
in its predecessor, and, in turn, founds its successor".
(31) The positivistic position of antecedence and
sequence, as the only relation between past and future,
is excluded. (32) The latter view would reduce everything
to a groundless becoming in which the present -vould not be
founded in the past, and would not found the future. There
would be no continuity. "The past founded the present, and
the present founds the future, but everywhere there are
ground and law". (33) In the doctrine of becoming, the
process alone is permanent. (34) The forms of the process,
which we tall things, are forever coming and going. "The
fact that one indivisible flow divides itself for our thought
f
into two factors—a ceasing and a becoming— involves no
more contradiction than the fact that the same curve is
both concave and convex when seen from opposite sides"
.
(35) When we look upon .the problem of change and identi
ty in this light, Bowne asks once more if they can be
reconciled.
Refutation Bowne concludes ::hat absolute
of the im-
personal- cha.ngelessness is impossible in im-
view
personal reality. He is forced to
give up the current notion of a thing as a changeless
substance with changing states. According to the popu-
lar understanding of the conservation of energy, when a
thing changes its phase, that thing becomes something
new. But when a new phase appears, the old vanishes
into the new. So a thing viewed ontologically is the
same thing throughout its phases, and when it produces
a new phase, it has vanished into its effect; i.e., the
cause disappears into the effect. Yet this notion of
phases is largely arbitrary, for time is not composed
of moments but is continuous. Being is perpetual pro-
cess, and motion and change are always present. This
whole discussion seems rather paradoxical, and will re-
main so as long as we conceive of a. world of things exist
ing apart from intelligence. (36)
#
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Categories must The successive phases of things
be understood
through intel- must be linked together by some law-
ligence
giving idea of God. It is not clear
how the idea can take on temporal form. We do not get
out of this difficulty without giving the underlying idea
intelligence and energy. This something, called "idea",
is abiding and enables us to escape the eternal flow.
Fortunately, we have this "something" revealed in our own
experience. "In personality, Or in the self-conscious
spirit, we find the or.ly union of change and permanence, or
of identity and diversity". (37) The self knows itself to
be the same in spite of the constant flow of experience.
"Only the personal truly is". (38)
The charge of Here, in the importance given by
anthropomor-
phism Bowne to the self and . self-conscious-
ness, we find that he and Hegel parallel
each other again in their thinking. ".... The self-conscious
knower is treated by Hegel as the ultimate fact, towhich all
other facts— if we may even speak of them provisionally as
independent facts —are relative, and in which they find
their explanation". (39) If self-consciousness is the
highest fact we know, then we are justified in using the
conception of self-consciousness as our best key to the
t«
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ultimate nature" of reality, or "of existence a.s a whole".
Since Hegel uses as his datura the human self-consciousness
,
and since Bowne uses "experience", it would seem that they are not
far apart in the bases upon which they build their systems.
At any rate, we are not illogical, if we interpret the lo" fer
in terms of the higher. The charge of anthropomorphism is
not a valid one.
Bowne 's final view Intelligence cannot be under-
of "change and
identity" stood through its own categories, but
"the categories must be understood
through our experience of intelligence itself". (40) This
means, that instead of viewing ontology as the interpreter
of personality, Bowne takes personality as the interpreter
of ontology. "Only personality is able to give concrete
meaning to those ontologival categories by "rich we seek
to interpret being" . (41) He sees that we must have
identity, and that we must recognize change, but that they
cannot be reconciled on the i... personal plane, for as abstract
principles they are in mutual contradiction, and will remain
so until they are unified in the changing substance of the
self-conscious thinker. (42)
1
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CAUSALITY As a formal category, the idea of
Definition of
Causality causality is simple and admits of no
definition. But we need to decide the form in which the
concrete category must be conceived. (43) Aristotle found
four causes in the processes of change or becoming: M (l)
the formal cause: the form or conception of that which is to
be, as it exists ideally, either in the essential nature of
things themselves or in the mind, - for example, the plan of
a house in the mind of the builder; (2) the material cause:
that which is to be wrought to this form, - as the brick,
timber, etc. of which the house is to be constructed; (3^)
the efficient, or moving, cause, - as the actual labor expended
in building; (4) the final cause: that which is the end or
object of the process, - as the completed house". *
"Every scientific conception of the causality of the system
assumes that similar causes must have similar effects, and that
there is some fixed quantitative and qualitative relation be-
tween the cause and the effect'! (44) Resident in things
there is an all-embracing harmony which enables us to depend
upon their acting in certain ways under certain conditions.
* W. T. Harris,, Webster's New International Dictionary,
Springfield, Mass.: 0. & C. Ferriam Co., 1S30 p. 351.
1
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Need of a If our universe is at all intelli-
" system"
gible, it must be a system. This uni-
fied oneness seems to be a related whole. We are surrounded
by, and are a part of ,a system of "law and order". But
there can be no unity without interaction of the many, and
there is no possibility of the interaction of the many,
without the unity of the all-embracing once.
Unity is We must have unity in our world
essential
system. That unity is the experience
of our own intellect. We must think of causation as
dynamic determination. (45) Bowne described causes in
terms of the effects. Effects come from causes only by
including them in the notion of being. (46)
Final view Bowne ' s view of causality brings
of causality
us again to the statement that the meta-
physical categories elude our apprehension until we put
them in terms of personal experience. (47) ,'e seek in
vain for any unity in impersonal causality that is satis-
factory. "Volitional causality.. is the only con-
ception of metaphysical causality in which we can rest"
.
(48)
I
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The laws of sequence and change may be studied under the
name of causation, provided we understand that this is not
causation at all. But for efficient causation, final
causation, there must he either volitional causality or
nothing. (49) If we are to escape the infinite regress,
which wrecks reason on the problem of error, "this volitional
causality must be viewed as self-determining or free". (50)
"Unity, identity, and causality are possible only through
free intelligence. Truth itself is possible only -through
free intelligence... What we call the interaction of the
many is possible only through the immanent action of the one
fundamental reality". (51)
THE WORLD- The fundamental and independent
GrR0U- TD
Relation of being which re call the infinite, or
the finite
to the in- the absolute, is the world-ground. It
finite
is the self-sufficient source of the
finite. It is not externally restricted and determined,
but is the basal causality by which the world is produced
and maintained. All things have their cause and reason
in this being. To explain the universe, the infinite
must be both causal and active. ^he danger of such
immanence is pantheism. When we understand Bowne's
transcendentalism, his immanence doctrine is not pan-
f
theistic. To stop with immanence is to lay personalism
open to the charge of pantheism. Bowne holds to a trans-
cendental immanence that goes "beyond the world of appear-
ances. While the infinite embraces all things, it must
embrace them as what they are. The finite has individu-
ality and personality which are inalienable. * If we
sweep everything into one conception of "Thought" or "Con-
sciousness", we are the victims o^ the "fallacy of the
universal" . (53)
Relation of Since the infinite is the world-
infinite to
the finite ground, it must be viewed as the primal
source of all finite existence. The finite has no ground
of being in itself, and hence its nature and relations must
have been originally determined by the infinite. Hence,
the finite is the result of a plan or purpose of the in-,
finite. Leaving freedom out for the moment, every finite
thing is what it is and where it is and when it is, because
of the plan of existence. (54) Both theism and atheism
regard the finite as dependent on the world-ground. Theism
calls the order of dependence a plan, while atheism calls
it "the nature of the infinite". In both cases this plan
or purpose is the determining principle of all finite exist-
ence. "All speculators alike, then, must pass behind the
finite and find the conditioning principle of the finite
to the infinite". (55)
* This is not an excerpt.
f
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Final view of Bowne's final view is a basal
"world-ground"
monism which applies to principles as
well as to things. Intelligence is the key to reality as
well as the sould of the categories. In affirming that
God is personal, Bowne means that the infinite knows and
determines himself and his activities. This does not
mean that God's consciousness is the same as ours. "The
essential meaning of intelligence is the power to know"
,
and the essential "meaning of personality" is "self-con-
sciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control". (14)
COSMOLOGY We come now to the second
SPACE division of Bowne's metaphysics -
Space and
coherence his cosmology. Space and time are
not so important for this thesis as
his other categories, and hence will not he treated in de-
ta.il. Under space, we consider what its true metaphysical
nature is, and how it is related to the things which are said
to be in it. (56) It is essential that we have a unified
system of thought but in the real space, apart from mind,
there is no unity possible if space is viewed as real. Ac-
cording to Bowne's theory, "space is neither a real thing nor
an ontological predicate". (57) The phenominal reality of
space is evident, and no one thinks of denying it. Our doubt
concerns only the ontological reality of space. The world
Space is phe- of. our experience is spatial. We
nomenal
\
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not in a world of illusions. Ultimately, space must
be an intuition and a mode of appearance. We cannot
affirm space of the infinite. (58)
TIMS "As a whole, time does not exist,
Ideality of
time and substantive reality is not in time
any more than it is in space". (59)
This is the essential conclusion of Bowne. There is
no independent time in which change occurs and by which
we can measure change. Change i s first, and time is
but the form of that change. Only by construing time
from the standpoint of self-conscious intelligence, in-
stead of from extra-mental existence, do we escape the
contradictions and impossibilities of the traditional
and idealistic views of time. We must look into
experience to explain time. Time is a "thought relation
which has neither existence nor meaning apart from
thought" . (60) Since thought ts the source of temporal
Solf-conscious relations, we must fall back
ness and time
upon experience to explain
time. Time becomes, instead of an ontologi^al fact,
a function of self-conscious intelligence.
MATTER, FORCE, Matter, as well as space and
AND MOTION
The phenome- time, is phenomenal. This
nality of
matter does not mean that matter is
illusory or fictitious, for we know it is a real part of
cc
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objective and universal experience. As phenomenal reality,
both time and matter have their laws. To a person on the
sense plane, matter offers no metaphysical problem. There
is no mystery, for everything is visible. Only when a per-
son begins to reflect does he encounter obstacles to the
common-sense view.
The atom- Many theories are advanced to
istic theory
give matter ontolo^ical existence, chief
among which is the atomic theory. But even the atoms which
modern science calls for are not mutually independent and in-
different. They are parts of a whole. If there can be
force without matter, then matter can no longer be supreme
.
(61
)
Final conclu- Bowne concludes that "the material
sion on mat-
ter, force world is not compounded of atoms and their
and motion
forces, but is rather a product of one
infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is con-
tinually supported, and from which it incessantly proceeds".
(62) We must remember that the atomic theory is only a
theory, and that it does not conflict with metaphysics unless
the atoms are thought of as ontological reality and as the
ultimate causal ground.
NATURE We have already answered the
Nature as
matter and question "What is nature?" when nature
force
is thought of aB phenomenon. It is
impossible to consider nature as matter and as force. The

The assigning of law to nature does not mean that nature
is a self-running mechanism. To give law power without
there being a law-giver is an admission of unclear thinking.
There is a difference between inductive and productive
causality. The laws of nature are not final cause. (63)
Thus the definition of physical nature becomes the following
nature is the sum-total and system of phenomena which are
subject to law. (64) The mastery of phenomenal laws does
not give us the causal connection of things. Nature is a
superficial name when applied to the mystery of causation.
It is an error to think of the "laws of nature" as a circle
of unbreakable, impersonal forces. While we live under a
system of law, it is not a "closed system". (65)
Evolution There is much confusion in the
popular mind concerning the theory of
evolution. "Evolution may be either a cosmic formula
or a biological doctrine". (63) If we take evolution
as a description of the development and phenomenal origin
of things, it is a good description and a valid theory.
But of course we cannot make evolution into a theory of
causation, without confusing our logical and metaphysical
thinking. "Considered in itself, nature is simply a form
of working for the expression and realization of a thought
or plan". (67) That plan is the result of the Living Will
which worketh hitherto, worketh now, and worketh evermore.
•
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Nature is thoroughly explained only by making it the ex-
pression of the immanent God, who supports this phenomenal
fabric we call "the world" by his living Presence.
Nature and There is no more important con-
supernatural
sideration for religion than the meta-
physical distinction between natural and supernatural. The
validity of prayer, the freedom of God, the freedom of the
individual, and the validity of reason are all vitally af-
fected by this differentiation. If there is no freedom,
reason founders on the fact or error. Bowne • s oosition is
made emphatic here. M A natural event is one which occurs
is an order in an order of law". (68) "....Mechanism is
a sheer fiction. Nature is God's continuous deed; and
natural laws are only his uniform ways of working". (69)
The mistake commonly made is that of thinking that all that
can be rescued from a "supernatural cause" is made purpose-
less. Thus if we assign an event to a "natural cause",
that events lack purpose. (70) The conclusion does not
follow, however, unless we allow that nature is essentially
blind, mechanical, and self-existent. But if nature be
intelligent, then all the believer cares to show is that the
natural products are intended no matter how they are realized.
The believer in purpose maintains that the divine purpose is
present whether the event occurs "naturally" or by divine
I•
21
fiat. (71) "But if it should turn out that the cause behind
the law is essentially personal and purposive, and that the
system of law represents only the general form of this free
causality, there would "be no difficulty in holding that events
in general are, at once, natural in the mode of their oc-
currence and supernatural in their causation. The natural
would be the mode of manifestation of the supernatural, and
the supernatural would be the real ground and administrator
of the natural". (72) As far as the religious interest
goes, the question is one of intended or unintended. (73)
Thus the supernatural is not something; foreign to nature,
but rather is the ever-present ground and the administrator
of the natural. The commonest event is as supernatural
as the strongest miracle, for God is implicated in both. (74)
Miracles It is rather difficult to
define miracle because of the confusion
in philosophical thought as to what constitutes a miracle.
According to Bowne, what is commonly regarded as a miracle
is not more so than theevents we take for granted every
day. The law is the important consideration even though
God is not found in the law. (75)
God's im- We have shown somewhat the
manence
view that Bowne holds as to the im-
manence of God in nature. It needs more emphasis. "Nature
f
22
is no independent something dividing the empire of the
world with God, but it is throughout subject to the
divine will and purpose, and is at bottom simply the
form which that purpose takes on as realized by that
will. God, then, is immanent in the world". (76)
"If the finite wishes to act upon God, say by prayer,
neither the prayer nor the person need go wandering
about to r^ach and find God; for we live and have our
being in him; and he is an ever-present power in us"
.
(77) Thus we make nature entirely dependent upon God
and the direct • manifestation of his will.
PSYCHOLOGY So far, we have been dealing
The soul
with the general metaphysical cate-
gories. Now we come to the world of mind. The central
point in Bowne • s psychology is the soul or the self. It
seems that the soul has received rather harsh treatment
at the hands of materialism and behaviorism. This is due
to a misunderstanding of what is meant by the soul. Material-
ism says that the soul is substantially nothing. Tne
various states of consciousness account for what used to
be called the soul. These states are produced by the
physical organism. Bowne says the physical can not pro-
duce the mental. Thought cannot be viewed under the mi-
croscope, nor is it composed of a grouping of the elements.
w
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The soul "is the self that thinks and feels and wills,
and in this activity experiences and knows itself as
the active and abiding subject of this inner life.
It is not something which can be sensuously presented;
it is what we all experience as ourselves" . (73) When
we say that the soul is real, we mean that it acts and is
capable of being acted upon. (79) "The reality of the
soul consists in its ability to set; ot\er reality it has
none". (30) Thus since we make the soul the living self,
we have no doubt about its existence.
The Mind-body With the reality of the soul
problem
made apparent, the problem of the re-
lationship between the mind and the body appears. The
word "mind" may be used interchangeably with the word
"soul" if we mean by mind more than brain. Mind is self-
consciousness. Briefly, Bowne holds that the mind and the
body are in interaction with each other. "Dependence
may be understood in the sense of causal production by the
organism and it may mean an order of concomitant variation
in the physical and the mental series. In the former sense
the mental life is not dependent on the organism. In the
latter sense there is mutual dependence of each on the other.
There are mental states arising in connection with organic
states; and there are organic states arising in connection
•
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with mental states. In this sense the causality works both
ways". * An absolute mental life would need no organism.
"....The finite spirit, in so far as it is in interaction
with other spirits and with the cosmic system, must always
need some fixed system for receiving and giving impulses;
otherwise it would not be in the world at all" . * It is
conceivable that under other conditions the mind might go
on without the present organism. Each is adjusted to the
other in accordance with the plan of the system we live
under. (31) We know that the physical and the mental
mutually affect each other, but it would be a poor piece
of metaphysics to say that the body can explain the mind
in terms of physical causation.
t
The origin Materialism has been rejected
of souls
as an explanation of causality. Hatter
does not have the power to originate souls. The view Bowne
adopts is "that where and when the divine plan, which is
the law of cosmic activity" calls for the creation of a
soul, "there and then a soul begins its existence and de-
velopment". (82) "It is not the outcome of its finite
antecedents, but is a new beginning...." * ho answer to
the problem of the soul's origin is complete which omits
God as the essential causality in the making of souls.
* Bowne, Metaphysics
,
p. 374.
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The future Metaphysics cannot say much that
of souls
is positive about the preservation of
souls. But we can say that the destruction of the body
does not necessarily mean the destruction of the soul,
since we do not make the body the causal ground of the
soul. God gave the soul life, and if he pleases he will
.aintain it. (83) While we say that moral values are
eternally significant values, we cannot build too much
hope upon speculation alone. At least, it is reasonable
to believe that immortality is possible.
FREEDOM AND One of Bowne ' s constant endeavors
NECESSITY
Definition of is to show that mechanism is purely
freedom
phenomenal. If in the study of life
we find it necessary to assume, in connection with law, an
element of choice and self-dir oction, freedom should not
appear more strange than the assumption we make of an -all-
embracing uniformity of law in the physical world. "By
freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direction,
the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to \"ork for
their realization" . "Abstract freedom exists as little as
abstract necessity". (84) In a world-scheme of necessity,
error becomes necessary and reason is overwhelmed in the
ensuing scepticism. It is because of this fact that free-
dom concerns logic and metaphysics more than it does ethics.
This closer relationship of freedom to logic is true for
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the purest type of freedom but not for the importance of
the questions involved. The important field for freedom
is that of ethics. (35) Bowne says that we need freedom
for the Absolute quite as much as we need it for the finite.
"An absolute freedom, unconditioned by any law whatever,
is simply our old friend pure being". "We must affirm
a fixed nature as the conditioned of freedom". (36) Yet
awhile there is a steady nature to the infinite, freedom
assumes that the system is not self-running, and therefore
not a "closed system" of law which cannot be altered by
the Divine Will.
Summary of We have completed the study
first section
of thesis of the essential categories and find
that Bowne has made the following valid conclusions from
his metaphysics:
(1) Experience is the ground upon which the cate-
gories are built.
(2) The categories do not explain the mind, but the
mind construes the categories.
(3) Matter is phenomenal, but mind is ontological.
(4) Ultimate reality is a unified, active, causal,
volitional, intelligent, personal Creator.
(5) Both the infinite and the finite have "freedom".
The next section of the thesis
will deal with the ethics of Bowne and its relationship to his
metaphysics
.
(
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PART II
ETHICS
ETHICS Two of the leading thoughts in
Aim of
ethics Bowne's ethical system are: (l) the
necessity of uniting the intuitive and
the experience schools in order to reach a working system;
and, (2) that the aim of conduct is not abstract virtue,
but the fulness and richness of life. (87) M A complete
ethics must consider the whole man and the whole field of
life". (38) Thus ethics must understand the principles
which underlie our lives if it is to be a correct and valid
guide. The principles laid down for conduct must take
account of things as they are, while pointing to things as
they ought to be.
The beginning The beginning of ethics belongs
of ethics
to that period of our human history known
as the pre-histor ic . But the question is not when ethics
began or how it began. These are psychological and
historical questions of factual importance but little moral
worth. A simple beginning of ethics will not undermine the
imperative quality of its principles. (89) The validity
of ethics must come from a study. of the inner laws of the
consciousness, as well as a knowledge of the practical ef-
r
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fects of conduct. By such a search we attain sure ground.
We are building our structure on experience, even as we did
with the important principles of metaphysics. "Man did not
begin by inquiring into the implications of ethical existence
and by settling all the metaphysical difficulties involved in
them , but he began by being ethical and by implicitly assuming
all that is implied therein. He did not prove that he had a
right to be ethical, but he found himself such. He did not
resolve the metaphysical puzzles in the notion of freedom, but
he found himself compelled to regard himself and his fellows
as responsible, and hence as free". (90)
Is ethics de- For the most part, the ethics of
pendent on
metaphysics? Bowne is dependent on his metaphysics.
Both systems are built on experience,
however. At times, Bowne rather despairs of finding any
help in metaphysics. This is true, at least, for an absolute
system of ethics. "The metaphysical attributes of the world-
ground are ethically barren. They furnish the possibility of
an ethical nature, but they do not imply it as a necessity".
(91) We must resort to "faith in our ideal of the perfect
being" or "appeal to experience to prove that the world-ground
proceeds according to ethical principles". (92) Here we see as
clearly as possible how Bowne believes that the intuitive and
experience schools should be united in our ethical theory.
Again, he says, "Our formal judgments of right and wrong have
no direct dependence upon theistic faith. It is at this point
t<
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that the moral argument has been most mismanaged. K w can the
obligation of justice, truth, benevolence, gratitude, be made
to depend even on the existence of God?... These are absolute
moral intuitions" . (93)
Bowne agrees There is much in common between
with Sorley
the ethical systems of Bowne and Sorley. The
latter rejects metaphysical ethics that are built without the
aid of moral experience. "The fault which is to be found with
metaphysical ethics is, in the end, just this, that is data are
insufficient. It tends to disregard that portion of experience
which is of greatest importance for its purpose; namely, moral
experience. It bases ethics upon metaphysics, and metaphysics
is an interpretation of experience, but it starts from a limited
view of experience, and tries to, pass to ethical concepts without
taking into account those factors in experience which are rele-
vant to the later inquiry, though they may not have been re-
quired for the earlier sta,ges" . (94) This is such a cogent
statement of Bowne' s thinking that I wish it might be credited
to Bowne rather than to Sorley. Bowne does not discount meta-
physics entirely, however, for on closer inspection the cate-
gories of metaphysics are found necessary. "Ethics begins
independently, but must finally be affected by our metaphysics.
Speculation does not have the function of generating our moral
judgments, but of adjustin them to our total intellectual
system. In this adjustment, the dependence of ethics on meta-
physics appears. The connection is the same as in the theory
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of knowledge". (95) It is in the category of purpose that
ethics receives confirmation from metaphysics. "This is the
explanation by intelligence which is supposed to be moving
towards preconceived ends, so that the activity is not merely
driven from behind, but looks before to some end to be reached,
and with reference to which the whole is determined. And
this explanation takes up all lower forms into itself. From
the orderly nature of mind we should expect an order of law,
not as a dumb fact, but as expressing at once the orderly
natureof intelligence and the way in which it realizes its
aims. From the mental demand for unity and continuity we
should also expect to find all things and events forming a
system in which everything conditions every other thing, and
in which each new sta.te of things grows out of a past state
of things. Explanation by intelligence, too, is the only
one which ever comes to an end. In any mechanical system
we not only reach no simpler state of things, but are shut
up to an infinite regress in which thought itself perishes.
An ultimate ground of things in which to rest can be found
only in free intelligence. This is the only simplicity
which can originate complexity; the only unity which can
produce plurality; the only universal which can specify
itself into particulars; the only real explanation of any-
thing" . (96)
I have repeated the above quotation at
length, with the danger of some repetition, because it
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is one of the best summaries in Bowne's works pointing directly
to the "coherence" criterion of truth.
The coherence While Bowne does not use the word
criterion
"coherence" in the final classification
of his system, he might well have done so, for it is the test
he constantly uses.
The ethical In no better way can we show the
use of unity
interrelationship of Bowne's ethics and
metaphysics than to go through the essential categories we
have been describing and point out their significance from
the ethical standpoint. When we have logically demonstrated
that the fundamental world-ground is one and not many, we have
taken the first step toward an intelligent system of things.
There can be no system without unity. The ethical principles
of man are a part of this unitary system and as such must find
their explanation within the system. 80 far does the meta-
physical category of unity carry us; it is not much, but it
is something.
' le shall consider the other categories in their
bearing upon ethics after we more clearly understand what Bowne's
ethical principles are.
Fundamental The Good, Duty, and Virtue are the
Moral Ideas
and their fundamental moral ideas, a.nd are alike
order
necessary. In the ancient systems of
ethics, the idea of the good was fundamental. There was much
difference of opinion as to what was the good. Some found
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it in pleasure; others in an indifference to pleasure; still
others in happiness. The general scheme might be called
"the goods ethics", or "the happiness ethics".
Definition of A definition of this important
goods ethics
school of ethical thought follows: "All
forms of goods ethics agree in finding the reason and obliga-
tion of action in the end, conceived as a good, to which action
is directed". (97) This is utilitarianism and as a system of
prudence and shrewdness it falls beneath the moral plane alto-
gether .
Duty ethics To the statement that certain
principles of conduct should rule our
actions, everyone agrees who has any moral insight worth con-
sidering. Justice, good-will, truthfulness are qualities which
stand in their own right without any support other than their
imperative qualities. "So far from deducing the idea of duty
from the notion of the good, we have to determine the content
of the good in accordance with our conception of duty. This
general view may be called the duty ethics" . (98) Here we
have the shadow of Kant falling upon the thought of Bowne;
morality is a "Categorical imperative". It is clear that the
duty ethics are nearer the facts of the moral life than the
goods ethics are. To have an adequate theory of conduct, we
i
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must account for both theories. Duty ethics alone tend,
to formalism, while goods ethics alone tend to shrewdness.
Neither school is adopted by Bowne to the exclusion of the
other
.
Reconeilia- No ethics, continues Bowne,
tion of goods
ethics and • can be formally right which ignores
duty ethics
results. " The ?;reat bulk of
duty refers to some form of productive activity; and here the
only assignable rational ground of obligation lies in its
relation to well-being" . (100) And yet in action that is
to be moral, we demand more than a consideration of results.
The motive must be considered apart from the material conse-
quences. Right action may, or may not, have external success
and yet have a pure ethical motive.
The motive There is grave danger of
of action
running into an ethics of intentions
with the duty school emphasis upon right motive. Hell is
paved with many a good "duty ethicist". I am not sure that
3owne is clear when he says that "the morality of the person
depends on his motives, but the morality of a code depends
on its consequences". (lOl) He does not mean that, for he
goes on to show that the good will alone is not enough. The
good will can exist only as there are natural goods concerning
which the good will wil i.8 something. It must will a choice
t
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or realization. There is a law of well-being as well as a
law of form. When a conflict occurs, the law of well-being
takes precedence. (1 5 It is in the apparent indifference,
and even the opposition at times of these two laws, which
gives rise to duty ethics and good ethics. The two must
be combined before we can reach any complete moral system.
It is claimed that a thing should be done solely because it
is right. Good ethics and duty ethics imply and sup-
plement each other.
Conclusion Bowne accepts Schleiermacher 1 s
on recon-
ciliation position that the good, duty, and vi£-
of duty and
good6 ethics tue are the fundamental moral ideas aid
that their order is that just given.
"There must be goods of some sort to give duty any rational
meaning; and the free and loving performance of duty is what we
mean by virtue". (103) "When these goods are seen in their
value and obligation, and the free spirit devotes itself to
their realization, we have moral activity". (104) "No con-
duct can be even formally right when the agent does not aim to
be materially right. The ideal of conduct demands both formal
and material Tightness". (105) A man must do more than the
best he knows to be right, for he must be in harmony with
reality and its laws. Which, if we must choose, does Bowne
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finally make the more important? "Formal Tightness, of course,
is ethically the more important, as it involves the good will;
but material Tightness is only less important, as without it
our action is out of harmony with the universe". (106) "Con-
sequences are the criteria of material Tightness; but to the
agent belongs the duty and the merit of its realization". (107)
Thus Bowne is Kantian in his ethics, even though he attempts
a reconciliation of the duty and the goods ethics. In the
ideal, however, the two are harmonized.
What is Our abstract ethics will do us
the good?
•no good unless we can determine what the
good is. Some would say that the good is that which is
desirable. Tie are told to watch life and see what men desire.
But the moral problem is not so simple as that. Men desire
things which they ought not to desire. (108) Some try to
find the good in pleasure. By comparing various objects in
units of pleasure, we are supposed to be able to find the
highest good. (109) The view that is called "deterministic
hedonism" is rejected, for it results in necessitarianism
and mechanism instead of morality. Ethics is left out
entirely; freedom alone ca.n change mechanism to morality. The
facts of life show that we are self-conscious beings able to
modify the mechanical and passive consciousness. We have de-
sire not only in the passive sensibility, but also in self-
consciousness. (HO) '.Thile no school ever proposed unhappi-
If
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ness as the end of ethics, we are not helped much by "being
told to seek happiness. We ask the question, "In what
conditions may happiness be found?" Bowne advances, as
the definition of the ideal good, the following: "The
ideal good is conscious life in the full development of
all its normal possibilities; and the actual 3;ood is greater
or less as this ideal is more or less approximated" . (ill)
From this we see that Bowne is somewhat of a perfectionist
in his ethics. He may develop an ideal life only in an
ideal environment, but an ideal character may be developed
without the perfect external conditions.
The good will While Bowne says that the good
and its en-
vironment will is very important, it needs a
field for its development which it-
does not create, but finds. (112) That' field is the
potentiality of our nature, which, in turn, is dependent
on a developed social order and the oo-working of the
physical world. "The good will cannot get far unless it
finds itself in a system which is adjusted to, and supple-
ments, its efforts. This is the ground of Kant's argument
for a world power which makes for righteousness and unites
virtue and happiness in the supreme good" . (113) Since
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I "believe nothing can out-rank a morality whose aim is the
attainment of the largest and fullest life, and since that
life would be "both the most perfect and the happiest, the
supreme good is the combination of perfection and happiness.
But our moral life is found to be adjusted to the total system
of the universe from the angle of perfection more than from ths t
of happiness. Society puts a deeper value upon the life of
"worth" than it does upon the life of superficial happiness.
By worth, I mean the life devoted to the production of moral
character, rather than to the passive enjoyment of life as it
is found.
Need of a O^r moral task as individuals,
subj ective
standard and as a society, is to develop this
life into its ideal form. But it is
impossible to find what this moral ideal is from the observa-
tion of the world or of life, . . . .We have to fall back on
some form of moral insight'! (114) This does not mean that
any individual standard is right. There w -uld be no law if
there was no standard. Individualism of the reckless kind,
which ignores reason and consequences, has never been held
by any one whose opinion was worth considering. It is ac-
cidental that the goods ethics has been allied to the selfish
psychology. This ethics simply holds that the obligating
ground of action must be in the good to which it is directed.
This is valid no matter what our psychology may be. The
question is "Can we completely determine our judgments of
right and wrong by what we know or anticipate of consequences,
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or must we also have recourse to some inner standard by
which consequences must be judged?" (115)
Spencer's If we retain the selfish
"Rational
Utilita- theory of desire, there is no progress
r ianism
in our ethical theory. But if we give
it up entirely, we are also in difficulty. It is doubtful
if the general is true, if the particular is not provided for.
Trying each case on its own merits is difficult, for we do
not know all the consequences. Spencer's "rational util-
tar ianism" says, it is "the business of Moral Science to
deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence
what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness,
and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this,
its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and
are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimation
of happiness or misery'! *(116) But Bowne believes that
setting up the greatest happiness of all, as the end of ac-
tion, does not solve our difficulties. Political reformers
may use the thought to advantage, as they usually do, but the
progress of ethical thought demands something more.
Conclusion We can allow that happiness
on subjec-
tive ethics is the aim of ethics, but that happiness
must have a law that is universally
binding. (117) Without that law, everything would be
arbitrary. Without universality, everything would be in-
* "Data of Ethics", par. 21.
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dividual caprice and whim. "The true ethical aim is to
realize the common good; but the contents of this good have
to be determined in accordance with an inborn ideal of human
worth and dignity". (118) W e are not abandoning the goods
ethics, "for while happiness must have a law, the law must
lead to happiness". (119) Whatever ethical system we adopt,
the interpretation of its principles will have to be by some
form of moral insight. (120) What is that moral quality
that is called " insight H ?
Moral insight The most eommoa name for moral
insight has been, and still is,
"conscience". 3o many crimes have been committed in the
name of conscience that the latter has suffered much damage
as far as any claim to infallibility is concerned. There is
no infallible guide to human cor- duct called conscience, but
there is a recognition that a difference exists between right
and wrong. We may differ as to what the right is, but the
idea of right lies at the foundation of all morality. Com-
bined with the recognition of a right, is the idea of obligation
to that right. "Many attempts have been made to define and
deduce this idea of moral obligation, but they all fail".(l2l)
It is more than a simple emotion; it is more than a reflex of
opinion; it is more than conformity to law. It is "the expression
of a hypothetical necessity". (122) Yet it is more than that.
The free spirit imposes the duty upon itself, which gives to
the act moral quality.
f
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One univer- We have not yet gone beyond
sal moral law
the formal law of obligation. *n actual
life, the one universal law binding upon us all is that of
good will or love. "The law of love is the only strictly
universal moral law for all normal social action" . (123 )
The performance of that law made a code is a guide. There is
general agreement as to what that code shall be, for the virtues
of benevolence, justice, gratitude, good will are approved and
their opposites are condemned. Yet moral insight and actual
conduct may not be the same, for "being is deeper than doing".
(124)
Causality In explaining causality
Bowne says that we must think of
causation as dynamic determination. But effects come from
causes only by including them in the notion of being. Now
morality is an effect. Man is moral; he has a moral nature.
Therefore in the original cause there must have been provision
for and encouragement of the moral nature now found in man.
This gives to morality a cosmic significance and places ethics
upon firmer ground than that of industrial caprice. If only
one man was moral, the argument would lose much of its weight.
In the universality of the essential ethical principles does
the moral argument gain in strength. When we add to the
argument of universality the arguments of experience and
of value, the cosmic demands for righteousness is found to
be reasonable.
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The impor- Man has not been, and is not
tanoe of
"will to yet, a perfect moral being. He has de-
do right"
veloped and is ahle to develop further. T -"e
is working toward an ideal and the most important factor in that
ideal is the will to do right. "Where this is present, the
most important element in moral development is given". (125)
Our code of conduct is subject to change, but the good will
muot abide. Moral progress can be made only by the good will
informed with high ideals and guided by the critical reason..
We might call Bowne's ethical system a rationalistic intuition-
alism.
Summary of The beginning of ethics does
second sec-
tion of not determine the validity of its principles,
thesis
Ethics is built on experience and the values
which arise from a study of the inner laws of consciousness. The
following summary of ethics may be made at this point:
(1) Bowne believes that the intuitive and experience schools of
ethics should be united.
(2) In the combination of duty ethics and goods ethics Bowne
agrees with Kant that duty ethics must be supreme, although
the demands of material Tightness is recognized.
(3) The one universal law binding on all is that of good will
or love.
(4) Ethics and metaphysics are interrelated in the categories
of unity, causality, freedome, and purpose.
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PART III
RELIGION
ETHICS A!!D It is natural to strive for unity
METAPHYSICS
MEET IN and coherence in our world-view. Intelli
RELIGION
Origin of gence will carry us far in the attempt to
religion
explain life and the cosmos. But beyond
our mightiest strivings, the dim mysteries of creation and ul-
timate destiny vanish into the misty portals of the unknown.
0ur religious consciousness brings into being the feelings of
awe, wonder, mystery, and dependence. Three questions we may
consider are the source of religion, the history of religion,
and the rational foundation of religion.
We do not now look upon religion as the
product of priestcraft or statecraft. The source of religion
is in the mind itself. Through the ages, we have been ex-
changing low and inadequate conceptions of religion for higher
and fuller ones. Religion has progressed as science has.
Experience shows that man was religious
before he became a philosopher. Thus we cannot say that re-
ligion is the result of reflection. Man has often been more
religious without speculation than with it. It is not very
helpful to call religion a product of a "religious faculty".
Any "religious faculty" comes from the attempt to explain re-
4
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ligion, rather than religion coming from a "religious Faculty".
It is hopeless to look for the source of religious ideas in ex-
ternal experience alone. We must assume that religion is
founded in human nature as one of its essential needs and con-
stitutional tendencies". (126)
The history of religion has some sig-
nificance for us. "In one sense only does the history of re-
ligion have any bearing on the question of its truth. When
we study the entire religious movement of humanity, noting not
only the crude forms in which it began, but also the higher forms
to which it grew, we may get a deeper sense of the universality
and ineradicability of the religious element, and also a valuable
hint of the direction in which its normal development lies. Such
a historical fact would be a revelation of the nature of things,
and would have the significance of any great cosmic manifesta-'
tion and product" . (127)
Rational O^r major concern, however, is
basis of
religion the rational foundation for the theistic
idea which is the central and basal ele-
ment of religion. We have religious ideas. Is there any war-
rant for them? "The theistic idea might be found to be absurd
or contradictory. Or it might appesr as an implication of
the religious sentiment only, and without any significance for
pure intellect. Or it might appear as a demand of our entire
nature, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and religious; so that
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the true and the beautiful and the good alike, would find in it
their root and spring". (128) In the last case, theism would
seem to have the warrant of the entire self.
Function of The function of the theistic
the theistic
idea idea may he two-fold. "Theism may be
advanced as an hypothesis for the ex-
planation of phenomena. As such it has no real function at
all, but solely a logical and metaphysical one". (129) In-
tellectual and metaphysical considerations as to the nature of
the absolute and the relative, the infinite and the finite, the
necessary and the contingent, the self-moving, and the moved,
cannot satisfy the religious consciousness of man. Again,
"theism may be held as the implication and the satisfaction
of our entire nature, intellectual, emotional, aesthetic,
ethical, and religious. These elements reach out after God
so naturally, end when developed, almost so necessarily, that
they have always constituted the chief actual grounds of theistic
belief. Accordingly the human mind has always a.djusted its con-'
ception of God with reference less to external nature than to its
own internal needs and aspirations". (130) It is in the latter
type of functioning, that we find ethics and metaphysics contri-
buting the elements that make up our idea, of God.
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Metaphysical
attributes
of world-
ground
There could he no being that
we could possibly call God that had not
certain metaphysical attributes. While
the metaphysical Being known as the world-ground may not elicit
from us the emotion of worship, there could be no God for the
ethicist without certain metaphysical presuppositions. There
can be no Be ing worthy of worship without ethical content.
Neither can there be any Being to worship without metaphysical
principles or attributes.
The unity of The first of these principles
the world-
ground is Unity. There must be a basal and
sufficient, absolute, independent. Since it is not limited by
posed upon God are self-limiting restrictions. Hence the rela-
tions God has with the world and man need not be restrictive.
"Metaphysics shows that ontological unity is possible only on
the personal plane, and that no regressive thought according to
tje law of the sufficient reason will ever pass from plurality
to unity". (131) If there be things and if there be interaction,
pluralism does not solve the problems of reality. A basal monism
does not solve all problems, but it is better than Pluralism. The
latter does not satisfy the desire of man's mind for an ultimate
a fundamental reality which is self
anything beyond itself, it is infinite. Any restrictions im-
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unity. T-pom monism it is possible to pass to theism. Poly-
theism is untenable; our theism must be monistic. So far the
affirmation has been made that the nature of the infinite is
one. Religion hopes to identify that One with God. "The
unity of the world-ground means not only that it is un-
compounded, indivisible, and without distinction of parts, but
also that there is but one such fundamental existence 1! (132)
The attribute Religion rather takes for
of Unchangea-
bility granted many of the imperative cate-
gories of metaphysics. The principle
of "identity and change" is called in theology "unchangeability"
.
This means the unchangeability of God is "the constancy and con-
tinuity of the divine nature which exists through all the divine
acts as their law and source. Metaphysics further shows that
if we insist upon having some abiding and identical principle
superior to change and constant in change, it can be found only
in personality" . (133) Many things are gathered up in this at-
tribute. Religious thought, as distinct from theological thought,
has meant something distinct from the metaphysical formula, One
aim has been to affirm the independence and eternity of God in
opposition to the dependence and brevity of man. "Again, the
predicate has often been made to mean the ethical constancy of
the divine activity, and to exclude all arbitrariness and caprice
fromthe divine purposes. In this last sense the attribute pa.sses

47
from the metaphysical into the ethical realm, and eludes any
metaphysical deduction or justification". (134) Unchangea-
bility escapes the vagaries of an eternal flow by "being a quality
of a self-conscious spirit, in which there can he a union of
personality traits. Only through an underlying "idea" that is
intelligent and active can there be abiding reality. Ethics
and metaphysics unite in producing the attribute of uncha.ngea-
bility.
The attribute The attribute of omni-
of Omnipresence
presence concerns God's relation to space.
Nothing that exists in space can be a unit. Thus omnipresence
means a denial of the limitations which beset us. "Omnipresence
is real only as the entire mind is present in each and every
point; as the entire mind is present in each and (sic) all its
thoughts". (133) Immediate action means presence, and immediate
action which extends to all things, is omnipresence. When we
accept the ideality of space, God, or the v/orld-ground can be
immanent or omnipresent in all things. Space must be only phe-
nomenal or omnipresence is impossible The importance of omni-
presence for religion is apparent. Prayer especially is made more
rational when God is everywhere active and complete. Communion
with the Unseen can be very real when we know it is not necessary
mentally to wander off into space to find God.
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The attribute Another metaphysical notion
flj -to Eternity
carried into religion is that of eternity.
This attribute concerns God's relation to time. From metaphy-
sics we learn that time is no form of existence but that it is
only a form of experience. We have often experienced the sur-
prising diversity in time-spans. Some days seem short; other
days, long. While there are so many minutes, mechanically, to
an hour, time is really a matter of experience. The full, happy,
joyous life is short and sweet. The unhappy, anxious life is
much longer; * If time is a matter of experience, a thought
relation, then it is phenomenal. "There is a large element of
relativity in our temporal judgments which may not be transferred
to God, being valid only for ourselves". (136) A being in full
possession of itself, forever what it will to K e, is not in time.
It has a changeless knowledge and a changeless life. For such a
being the present only exists. In the relationship of God to
our temporal world, it is necessary to fall back upon "transcen-
dental empiricism, and interpret our terms by the living ex-
perience of intelligence. The self-identity or self-equality
of intelligence is the only real changelessness of which we have
experience All else is abstract fiction". (133)
The writer 1 s
.
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The attribute "Absolute personality must be
of Omniscience
absolute self-knowledge and self-control".
(139) There is only one way out of our difficulty of positing
freedom in us and omniscience in God. We must allow the
possibility of God having modes of knowing which are unknown to
us. It is not proved that a foreknowledge of freedom is a
contradiction and yet we cannot conceive such a possibility.
This traditional problem vanishes, however, with the acceptance
of the ideality and relativity of time.
The attribute For God to be omnipotent the
of Omnipotence
world-ground must be conceived as agent,
not substance, and as cause rather than "stuff". The heart of
an ethical being is his will. If God has no will, then he
is not ethical. He may be a great, powerful, necessitarian law,
but he is not a person. Without the power to choose there can b
no worthy personality. "At every point the absolute will must
be present to give validity and reality to the otherwise power-
less necessities of the divine being. In this sense we may say,
with Spinoza, that God is the cause of himself. He incessantly
constitutes himself the rational and absolute spirit. God is
absolute will or absolute agent, forever determining himself ac-
cording to rational and eternal principles" . (140) That abso-
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luteness of will is abstract for the metaphysician, but for
the religionist it becomes synonymous with the Good, Duty, and
virtue. The leap is one of faith, but not a wholly irrational
one. Choosing the best elements from life and experience, the
religiously minded build a conception of God which should, be the
image of the beet that we know.
Ethical attri- We have explained some-
butes of the
world-ground what the connection which metaphysics
has with religion. The mind rebels
at a purely metaphysical conception of God. It demands a re-
ligious conception adequate to human needs. That is why some
people would rather worship the man Jesus than the God Jesus
tried to reveal. * In our study so far we have not reached
the God of religion. Much remains to be done before we can
attribute ethical qualities to the world-ground.
The question is settled
at once if we accept the mental ideal of
a perfect being as the ground of the universe. A perfect whole
would inculcate within itself the moral attributes of the Good,
Duty, and Virtue.
* The writer's.

51
"There is no way of speculative deduction; for the meta-
physical attributes, as we have said, are ethically barren.
We must, then, either have immediate faith in our ideal of
the perfect being or else appeal to experience to prove
that the world-ground proceeds according to ethical princi-
ples. O^r actual procedure is a mixture of both". (141)
"The empirical argument for the
moral character of the world-ground is derived from our
moral nature, the structure of society, and the course
of history. The two first are held to point to a moral
author, and the last reveals a power not ourselves, making
for righteousness, and hence moral". (142) It is taken
for granted that where there is a moral nature, there is a
moral author. The assumption is a spontaneous one. There
is no known way of deducing the moral from the non-moral,
except by begging the question. "Spontaneous thought
has generally regarded the moral nature in man as pointing
to a moral character in God as its only sufficient ground".
(143) Man is a par lb of the unity we attempt to make of
all reality. His nature is the microcosm which reveals
the nature of the macrocosm. *
* The writer's, with apologies to Professor Earl Marlatt.
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Then we have the structure of life and of
society, and the course of history, pointing to moral ideas
and a moral aim. Nature places a strong approval upon "the
virtues of industry, prudence, foresight, self-control,
honesty, truth, and helpfulness". (144) The way of virtue
tends to life abundant, while the way of sin tends to sorrow
and death. Nature seems to he on the side of righteousness.
The objection may now easily he raised that such a view is
partial. Nature also is cruel, impersonal, and unmindful of
man. But such a statement is also partial. Nature is both
cruel and good, harmful and helpful, ugly and beautiful. We
pick out what we desire to call good and place that above us
as the ideal toward which the world is moving. That ideal
takes upon itself the personality and purpose we call by the
name of God. It does not seem that, society in the long
run is an institution organized for moral ends. "Out of
the clash of selfish interests a moral system emerges".
(145) We can easily find illustrations for our faith,
but no demonstration that is satisfactory. The deepest
facts, however, do not come to us as the result of syllogisms
but from the experience of life. "Life is deeper than logic"
God and That there is purpose in the world seems
purpose
evident to the unbiased observer. In the
"Theory of Thought and Knowledge", purpose is listed as a
(
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category. Bowne's metaphysics clearly implies purpose
as an immanent mental principle. "Intelligence and reason
are such only as they are guided by ends; and a guidance
by ends emans 'nothing except as those ends are present in
consciousness as ideal aims". (146) "The notion of a world-
government acquires rational meaning only as some supreme
good exists which is to be the outcome of creation, and which,
therefore, gives the lav/ for all personal activity. A
world-government implies a world-goal which in turn, implies
a world-law" . (147) That moral values are able to develop
shows, at least, that the world-ground is not unfriendly, to
morality. When an environment is helpful, and when that en-
vironment sees beyond mere helpfulness to imperative necessity
we are justified in assuming that we are part of a system whic
is adjusted to and supplements our efforts. It is then that
metaphysics and ethics fuse their attributes into an all-
embracing Purpose. The only sufficient world-goal is found
in the world of value and morals. Morality as the purpose
of the Creator implies morality in the Creator, an element
we have not heretofore assigned to the world-ground.
Ethics and God has been posited as the
Causality
metaphysical cause behind all activity.
He is the mind which explains all phenomena, a.s ontological
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reality. If that is true, then "there is no getting out
of a cause something that was not at least implicitly in
it". (148) If matter is made to explain everything, we
must define matter so as to include all of life with its
moral demands. When the moral law becomes the expression
of a Eoly Will, it no longer is an impersonal abstraction.
Ethics and In the world-ground there
Freedom
is no mechanical necessity implied in the
notion of law. The world is administered by freedom for
the attainment of rational ends. No metaphysical necessity
is possible in an intelligent universe where freedom is neces
sary for rational unity, completeness, and systematic con-
nection. Rationality stands or falls with the belief in a
free and intelligent ground of things. While the freedom
of man is limited, the freedom of God is limited only by
the demands of his own nature. Freedom is the power of self
control and self-direction in an intelligent being. It is
the pover to form plans, .purposes, ideals and to work for
their realization. It is the power to choose between com-
peting or conflicting possibilities and to realize the one
chosen. Conscious agents arethe only ones who can act and
choose and thus be moral beings.
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Freedom We know that there are errors
and error
in our world. There is error in thought
and error in act. The only solution to the problem of
error is freedom. Reason cannot be trusted unless freedom
is allowed to explain error. We need to have freedom to en-
able us to distinguish between the truth and error and to
enable us to determine the standard for our thinking. Re-
ligion is interested in this phase of thought because the moral
nature is stressed as the basis of authority rather than an
external code. Freedom allows us to violate the code without
destroying its authority. Any necessitarian system is disas-
trous to morality and intelligence. The only system of thought
which is consistent with morals and ideal is theism. There is
no reason why a free spirit cannot be created by a free God.
It is in the free spirit imposing duties upon itself that
morality arises. The center of character is the will to do
right
.
ETHICS AND The most dangerous foes to personal
PANTHEISM
ism are. positivism and pantheism. Pan-
theism is more dangerous because it is almost within the scope
of the divine immanence doctrine. Bowne has sufficiently dis-
counted positivism by his emphasis upon intelligence and con-
I
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sciousness in the world-ground. Where there is freedom
in ultimate reality, there can be no mechanical necessity
and hence no sympathy with positivism. Pantheism is the
real rival of theism.' . By the former the world is made
either a part of God or a necessary part of the divine
nature. Theism holds that the world is a free act and
creation of God . The finite, if it "be more than phenome-
nal, must be viewed as produced by God, not from God. It
is necessary to- drop all quantitative and. spatial concep-
tions in order to view God as entire in every mode, and
the modes as forms of his activity. "The existence of
the world in God means simply its continuous dependence
on him". (149) f True substantial existence, in
distinction from phenomenal existence, can be predicated
only of persons". "Identity, unity, causality, substan-
tiality are possible only under the personal form. On
all these accounts the impersonal can only be viewed as
dependent phenomenon, or process of an energy not its
own". (150) With pantheism there is complete determinism
in ^od and in man. The latter becomes part of the im-
personal whole. There is no room for freedom, and hence
none for purpose. No distinction can be made between good
and evil. Sin and error become a part of God. Thus the
i
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metaphysical conception of freedom in the world-ground is
very essential for ethics and for religion.
Pantheism, Theism does not teach that
theism, and
creation. "nothing caused something", but rather
that &od caused a new existence to begin, and in such a
way that he was no less after the creation than he was
before. God did not make the world from nothing as a
raw material, nor from himself. He caused that to be
which apart from his activity had no existence. Creation
reconciles the unity of God with the existence of the
finite. Pantheism, in making the world a part of God
under the category of quantity, is untenable. Hence
pantheism is rejected on both rational and ethical grounds.
Pantheism, An unethical God is not an
immanence
,
and trans- object worthy of worship. If evil and
cendence
error find their way into the God-head,
worship is not apt to be true worship. Bowne adds the
idea of transcendence to the doctrine of the divine imman-
ence. God is the Eternal Presence, but he is also the Trans
cendent Ruler. There is no moral significance in his im-
manence. "It is simply the dependence of all finite things
(
53
on God, and involves no spiritual likeness or nearness.
We may all live and move and have our being in God, without
any spiritual sympathy". (151) Metaphysical immanence
does not imply moral and spiritual character. Moral sym-
pathy and character cannot be reached by speculation. The
ethical qualities which we add to the nature of God are from
the interpretation of our own moral experience. They rep-
resent the demands of the entire man for rationality, morality,
and unity in the Almighty Architect.
The need of All the diverse elements
religion
of our nature work together to construct
a religious ideal. The intellect has its ideal; the con-
science brings its perfect conception; and the affections
bring their ideal. Into one Perfect Whole, all these ideals
are moulded. ^-any are the gates that lead to God. To some
extent the real universe recognizes the ideals. Reality
does have rationality, goodness, and beauty in varying degrees.
Faith is needed to make the assumption that the glimmers of
moral truth revea.led to us are the products of a beneficent
creator. "The mind is not driven by any compulsion of ob-
jective facts, but rather by the subjective necessity of self-
<
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realization and self-preservation". (152) Our, thinking
rests upon a teleological foundation. We find in our uni-
verse those thing's which our nature demands. "One great
source and spring of theological progress has been the need
of finding a conception of Sod which the moral nature could
accept" . (153) There is a perpetual necessity of recasting
theology in the light of higher moral truths. "Thus science,
ethics, and religion grow; and the mind, in its increasing
sense of self-possession and of harmony with the reality of
things, becomes more and more indifferent to the objections
of the skeptic, and works with ever growing faith to build
up the temple of science, of conscience, and of God" . (154)
"....The force of the ethical demand for an ethical Creator
can never be felt from mere reflection upon psychological ab-
stractions, but only from living participation in the moral
effort and struggle of humanity". (155) Activity in the
moral realm is as essential for us as activity in the meta-
physical realm is for God.
Theism and It is difficult to find a
Christianity
warm, compelling religion in the abstrac-
tions of metaphysics. We must clothe the skeleton we have
produced with our own faith. That is an individual matter
which depends upon the nature of the person involved. No
one can prescribe my religious faith for me. I am free to
I
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reject doctrines if they do not coincide with the moral
character of God as I have conceived it. On the other
hand, I must accept those conclusions which history and
reason stamp as truth, or be untrue to the facts. We add
to the bare facts of the intellect the warm intuitions of
the affections as we construct the nature of the Divine
Being. * "The speculative intellect necessarily stops
short of the religious idea of God, but it gives us some
fundamental elements of the conception". (156) Our
aesthetic and ethical nature demands a God with ethical at-
tributes. Theism is the sum and source of all our ideals.
"The cognitive ideal of the universe, as a manifestation of
the Supreme Person, leads to theism. The moral ideal of the
universe, as a manifestation of the Supreme Righteousness,
leads to theism. The practical ideal of a "far-off divine
event to which the whole creation moves" leads to theism.
(157)
Christian theism is adequate for our
moral inspiration because of three things. (l) By affirm-
ing a free Creator and free creatures it gives moral govern-
ment a meaning. (2) By making the moral nature of man
the manifestation of an omnipotent and eternal righteous-
ness which underlies the cosmos, it sets our moral convic-
tions above all doubt and overthrow. (3) It provides a
* The writer's.
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conception of man and his destiny that gives man a worthy
task and an inalienable sacrednes •. We may be true to
the highest and the best in us, confident that it will not
lead us astray. The contention is not that Goo exists as
the product of a syllogism, but that theistic faith is an
implication of the moral and the practical life, without
which, thought and morality are in hopeless confusion. To
Borden Parker Bowne , a name I speak with the utmost respect,
experience meant self as well as sense, feelings as well as
facts, love as well as logic. In this composite experience,
the moral and religious values were the deepest and most
fundamental realities. *
IN CONCLUSION One of the main distinc-
tions in my thesis is the difference
between phenomenal and ontological reality. Space, time,
and matter are all phenomenal. Only selves, souls, and
mind have ontological reality. By that I mean that ul-
timate reality is mind rather than matter. The essential
metaphysical categories are being, the "nature of things"
or things as laws of activity, change and identity, causality,
the world-ground, space, time, activity, unity, and freedom.
Experience is the ground upon which the categories are built.
* The writer's.
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The latter do not explain the mind,' hut the mind construes
the categories. Ultimate reality is a unified, active,
causal, volitional, intelligent, personal force. Both the
finite and the infinite have "freedom".
The metaphysical categories are ethically
barren, hut a guide to life is found in ethics. The
source of ethics is the inner consciousness and the field
of life. Both metaphysics and ethics build on experience.
For the most part, the ethics of Bowne is dependent on his
metaphysics. But we need the help of moral experience to
make a working system of ethics. In the use of the meta-
physical categories, ethics is shown to depend largely on
•metaphysics for its unity and coherence, if not for its
validity. Bowne conciliates the goods ethics and the duty
ethics. In the long run, unless results are good the ac-
tion can not be ethical. Bowne accepts 3chleiermacher '
s
position that the good, duty, and virtue are the fundamental
moral ideas. Formal Tightness is more important than material
rightness. Bowne is Kantian in his emphasis upon formal
ethics
.
Th© good will is important but it needs a field
for its development. This environment is not the product of
the self; it is given to us. The world-ground is not un-
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friendly to morality but seems to demand morality from all.
Bowne 1 s ethical system is a rationalistic intuitionalism.
Ethic' s and metaphysics meet in religion. The
history of religion and of life, the structure of society,
and the nature of man show the universal appeal of re-
ligion. Religion is demanded "by the rational, t^.e aesthetic,
and the moral nature of man. While the metaphysical attri-
butes of the world-ground are barren of ethics, we clothe the
bare attributes of metaphysics with the living necessities
of our practical nature. The metaphysical 3od is adequate
for religion. Morality demands a moral God. The world-
ground must be defined so as to include man's moral nature.
When that is done, the world-ground becomes moral. If it
is not done, we are not true to the facts of experience.
Morality cannot come from non-morality,
The nature of God cannot be demonstrated. What
we decide is the nature of the world-ground shows what our
oxvn character is as much as anything else. If we choose
the best and call the result "God" we are true to the
highest in life. Experience is a safe criterion when
balanced by coherence. The experience of the moral nature
demands a moral God. When, the rational nature and the
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aesthetic nature also demand a moral God, judgment is
conf irmed.
The only adequate world-view for
metaphysics, ethics, and religion is that of theism. Pan-
theism founders on the fact of error. Only in freedom
can we reconcile God and error and the reconciliation is
not wholly satisfactory. We are free spirits, neverthe-
less, created by a free God. Transcendence brings the imma-
nent God above the limitations of the world and pantheism.
The ethics of Bowne is for the most
part dependent on his metaphysics. This dependence appears
in the attempt to formulate an harmonious intellectual
system. Especially important are the following inter-
relations :
(l) Ethics and causality; (2) ethics and unity;
(3) ethics and freedom; (4) ethics and purpose.
Since experience is the basic elements
in Bowne 's systems of metaphysics and of ethics a close re-
lation appears at this point also. But beyond our immediate
experience extends the larger realm of faith. Beyond our
immediate experience extends the larger realm of faith. Beyond
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our certainties are the mysteries. Both metaphysics and
ethics depend upon religion for their consummating agree-
ments. Hot that religion is outside our experience. On
the contrary, religion can be the sum of all our aspirations
dedicated to the all-inclusive purpose of doing God's will.
"Religion is the p ssion for righteous ness and the spread
of righteousness conceived as a cosmic demand". (Lecture 4,
Hist, and Phil, of Rel., Prof. Hocking, Harvard, 1930).
Here we see why ethics must end in r-ligion. If there is a
cosmic demand for righteousness, I am hound to heed that
call as the voice of God. On the other hand, the attempt
to arrive at the attributes of the world-ground must likewise
end in religion. Bowne comes finally to the conclusion
that the world-ground is personal and purposive. In that
conclusion he reaches theism. Without metaphysics ethics
is isolated and unauthoritative. Without ethics n etaphysics
is unrelated to life and hence incomplete as an explanation
of reality. Stopping short of religion, both ethics a.nd
metaphysics stop short of ultimate reality. It is in re-
ligious faith, unproved by logic, but confirmed by intuition,
that we reach the knowledge of the Whole.
The best name for Bowne 's system as a
whole is "personalism" . He was a "pragmatic personalist"
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although he went beyond pragmatism to coherence. It is
natural for a man to develop as he matures. Bowne's de-
velopment is from "Objective Idealism" to "Transcendental
Empiricism". The shift is from logic to experience.
Bowne's system is a pragmatic idealism from the ethical
standpoint, and a pragmatic, idealistic transcendentalism
from the metaphysical view. Both systems are united in
his religion. *
* This paragraph is the writer's.
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